If an exchange pauses withdrawals, the immediate question for an institution is not only whether its assets will be reimbursed. It is also whether it can access funds needed elsewhere while the pause lasts.

In a BigTime report published on November 12, 2026, with research checked through November 9, the firm examined reported thefts at Bitget, Binance and Mercado Bitcoin over roughly six weeks. All three platforms said they would bear users’ losses. Those commitments should not be mistaken for completed reimbursement: BigTime said Mercado Bitcoin had not restored withdrawals by the time of its report. It found no public report of institutions directly losing principal in the three incidents, but cautioned that protection ultimately depends on a platform’s ability to pay.

The access problem was substantial even where reimbursement was promised. According to BigTime, Binance suspended withdrawals for about 54–56 hours, Bitget took about a week to restore withdrawals for all assets, and Mercado Bitcoin had not announced a restoration time. BigTime cited Binance’s own estimate of approximately $6.3 billion in losses; that figure was not independently audited in the report.

Three layers of exposure management
Set a balance limit for each exchange. BigTime proposes measuring an institution’s balance at each venue against its net assets, then asking how much it could afford to have inaccessible—and for how long. A limit reduces dependence on any one venue, but assets kept there remain exposed to that venue’s custody and withdrawal controls.

Separate custody from trading where possible. In an off-exchange settlement arrangement, a third-party custodian holds assets while an exchange grants trading capacity against them. That can reduce the amount held directly by the exchange. It does not eliminate counterparty risk: gains awaiting settlement may still be claims on the exchange, and the custodian introduces its own security and legal-structure questions. BigTime found insufficient public information to determine how such arrangements worked during Binance’s withdrawal pause. Before relying on one, an institution needs to establish whether custodied assets would remain movable and how settlement would proceed if withdrawals stopped.

Examine reserves and loss-absorption capacity without treating them as guarantees. BigTime cited exchange proof-of-reserves disclosures and protection funds as useful checks, while noting that reserve snapshots do not establish a platform’s full liabilities. It reported that Binance used part of its SAFU protection fund after the theft and said it would replenish the fund, without specifying when. BigTime’s account says Binance’s promised coverage relied principally on company funds rather than SAFU alone.

These are complementary checks, not a way to remove every custody risk. BigTime’s practical test is to consider both a temporary lockup and the harder case in which an exchange cannot make users whole. Its figures and incident accounts draw on platform statements, third-party data and media reporting, with differing methods and some claims unverified by audit.

Source: techflowpost.com (originally published 2026-11-12 10:51 UTC+8)
