Holding assets in a vault introduces a risk separate from keeping a wallet’s recovery credentials safe: the vault must account correctly for what each depositor can redeem. In a November 19, 2026 report, TechFlow said an attacker exploited share accounting in K3 Capital’s Ethereum sBOLD savings vault, draining approximately $3.4 million in liquidity through 97 transactions over about eight minutes—an average of roughly $425,000 per minute.
How the reported exploit worked
sBOLD is a yield-bearing vault built around BOLD, the stablecoin of the Liquity protocol. According to Bitquery’s transaction analysis, the attacker repeatedly deposited BOLD, introduced wrapped ether (WETH) that was not accounted for on the vault’s balance sheet, and converted it internally to BOLD. This inflated the calculated redemption value of each sBOLD share, allowing withdrawals at the expense of other depositors.

Who received the withdrawn funds
Bitquery reported that an automated front-running bot copied and replaced parameters from the attacker’s pending transaction, withdrawing about $1.91 million—56.18% of the roughly $3.4 million total. To win priority, the bot paid approximately $1.78 million in fees to block builders, leaving it about $130,000, or 6.81% of the amount it withdrew.
The report said Titan built most blocks containing the front-running transactions, while BuilderNet, Ultrasound and Quasar also participated in ordering related blocks. On-chain researchers cautioned that the $1.78 million was gross builder revenue: builders still had to pay for block proposals through MEV-Boost. The original attacker and the wallet that initially funded the attack reportedly netted about $520,000.

Audit warning and unresolved questions
ChainSecurity completed a code audit of sBOLD in May 2025 that warned of a route to extract excess value through self-liquidation. Whether that warning describes the mechanism used in this attack was still under investigation in the November 19 report; the two should not be treated as confirmed matches.
The report said the team was monitoring cross-chain fund movements with tracking organizations while assessing depositor losses and working on code repairs. It also identified restricting non-allowlisted token transfers, limiting redemptions per block and using time-weighted oracles as potential defenses for ERC-4626 vaults—not as protections confirmed to have been in place at sBOLD.
