SnifferCoin

Wallet custody, cryptographic trust boundaries, vulnerabilities, audits and practical defensive habits

Sui Move Security: What the Verifier Does Not Check

If you hold assets in a Sui-based protocol, passing Move’s type system and verifier is not the same as proving that the protocol’s rules are safe. An article published on 13 November 2026 at 21:16 (UTC+8) examines that distinction through Certora Sui Prover.

The author identifies five gaps that require explicit checks: bits lost during a shift; a signed value stored in an unsigned integer; a privileged function without a caller check; an object ownership relationship that goes unchecked; and an older package version that remains callable. The article discusses vulnerabilities involving Cetus, Aftermath Finance, Typus Finance and Scallop, without establishing that every gap affected every protocol.

For verification work, the author expresses the gaps as Certora rules P1–P4 and extends the approach to protocol invariants P5–P8. The article also suggests testing with test_scenario and Sui Prover. Its practical lesson is about the trust boundary of any such test: first state the property and the assumptions being checked, rather than treating a passing verification result as a blanket security guarantee.